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We develop an equilibrium model of wages and estimate it using administrative data from 
Norway. Coworkers interact through a task-assignment model, and wages are determined 
through multi-lateral bargaining over the surplus that accrues to the workforce. Seniority 
affects wages through workplace output and relative bargaining power. These channels are 
separately identified by imposing equilibrium restrictions on data observing all workers within 
workplaces. We find joint production is important. Seniority affects bargaining power but is 
unproductive. We reinterpret gender and firm-size effects in wages in light of the rejection of 
linearly separable production. 
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This paper develops an equilibrium model of joint production designed to explain
wages in matched data sets. The primary question we address is an old one: what is the
relationship between seniority (tenure) and wages? We shed new light on this question
by allowing seniority and wages to be related through two channels. The ￿rst is the
usual productivity channel: seniority is a proxy for accumulated ￿rm›speci￿c skills. The
second is a distributive channel: seniority affects a worker’s bargaining power relative to
coworkers when distributing the surplus created by the workplace. The combination of
an equilibrium model and rich data allows us to separate these channels. Using matched
data for Norway in 1997 on a large sub›sample of all workplaces we estimate the model
to disentangle the absolute and relative affects of seniority and to re›interpret estimates of
models that assume coworkers do not interact.
Beforethearrivalofwidelyavailableadministrativedatamatchingworkerswiththeir
employers (Haltiwangeretal. 1999) mostlabormarketresearchuseddataonindividuals.
When an individual’s coworkers are unobserved it is natural to model output as linearly
separable across workers within a ￿rm. The assumption of linearly separable workers
has also been maintained by recent models of the labour market, such as Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) and Postel›Vinay and Robin (2002). There is no lack of models of how
workers interact within ￿rms (see e.g. Boyd et al. 1988 and Sattinger 1993), but they
are often considered as applying to single or homogeneous ￿rms or to a narrow segment
of the labor market with special data available for it. Matched data sets create a new
opportunity to consider questions that apply to the full spectrum of workplaces.
The joint technology we develop is a recursive task assignment model of production
within ￿rms based on Rosen (1982). Worker talent is allocated across tasks to equalize
intermediate output and its demand from the top›level task. Workplaces with different
workers have a different assignment problem and end up allocating talent differently.
The empirical speci￿cation is chosen to include as a special case the separable technology
1whereworkerskillisconsistentwithaMincerwageequation. Inthelinearcaseaworker’s
observed wage equals their value marginal product (VMP). But when heterogeneous
workforces engage in joint production this condition is neither necessary nor suf￿cient
to describe equilibrium wages. First, a worker’s internal VMP can only be determined
by hypothetically removing the worker and re›allocating the remaining workers to tasks
and computing total output. The workplace creates a surplus jointly that must then be
allocated jointly. We use multi›lateral Nash (1950) bargaining to allocate the surplus.
Even with joint production but without labor market frictions, in a long run equilibrium
all workers would be assigned coworkers such that their VMP is no lower than in any
other workplaces. We study a static equilibrium in which workforces are given and
frictions exist. This creates a second wedge between wages and VMP, because a single
worker does not have a well›de￿ned external VMP. The joint technology determines the
worker’s contribution to their workplace and its distribution across other workplaces. In
our model there is competitive pressure on the outside alternatives (threat points) in the
Nashbargainingproblem. Inthestaticequilibriumoutsidealternativesequaltheexpected
outcome from a hypothetical search and bargaining outcome for another workplace. 1
OurdatacomefromoneyearofamatchedpanelofNorwegianworkplaces(described
in Salvanes et al. 1999) that combines information from a number of administrative
databasestoprovideacompletepictureofemployment,earnings,transfersandeducation
fortheNorwegianpopulation. Parametersareestimatedby￿ttingthemodel’spredictions
to a 20% sample of all workplaces with more than one employee. The main question we
address with our estimation of a joint economy equilibrium is the relationship between
wagesandseniority. TheusualstartingpointforthesequestionsisaMincerwageequation
such as
lnW = b0Exper + b1Exper
2 + b2Sen + b3Sen
2 + ... (1)
1 Teullings (1995), Ferrall (1997), and Costrell and Loury (2004) are recent examples of
task assignment models. In each case no workplace›speci￿c surplus is created so that the
wage›ability relationship is determined by competition.
2where Exper is years of labor market experience, and Sen is years with the current em›
ployer (e.g. Mincer and Jovanovic 1981). In our context we have a measure of actual
experiences as opposed to potential experience (Age › Years of Schooling › Age at School
Start). Usually (1) is estimated separately for men and women. Since seniority is based
on job choices in the past, which in turn depends on unobserved determinants of current
wages, OLS estimates are likely to be biased. A line of research has worked to construct
consistent estimates of (1) or some variant of it. Some work stresses use of panel data on
individuals to correct for endogeneity of seniority. Two recent examples are Altonji and
Williams (2005), who ￿nd modestly rising concave seniority pro￿les and Dustmann and
Meghir (2005) who ￿nd rising pro￿les and some ￿at or even declining pro￿les in some
occupations.
We use the equilibrium Nash bargaining model of a workplace’s whole payroll to
address two issues related to seniority. First, much empirical work glosses over the in›
determinant nature of the wage›seniority relationship. With ￿rm›speci￿c capital comes a
bilateralsurplusheldbythe￿rm›workerpairwhichfacesnooutsidecompetitivepressure.
Nothing requires wage pro￿les to trace out the marginal (social) return to a worker’s se›
niority (even in the linearly separable model). This contrasts with general skills for which
wages re￿ect value marginal product. Rather, a range of seniority pro￿les are consistent
with equilibrium.2 We pin down the difference between productivity and wages by mod›
eling coworkers who produce together and share their part of the surplus in equilibrium.
Rather than emphasizing panel observations we emphasize matched observations that
provide a snapshot of whole workplaces to tie down total product of the workforce acting
as a team.
Second, models that rely on linear output have no room to consider the role of factors
internal to the ￿rm in wage settings. We allow the surplus sharing rule to depend on
2 This is separate from explanations of seniority pro￿les due to information and incen›
tives, as discussed in Hutchens (1989) or Prendergast (1999).
3relative seniority. This makes operational insider›outsider wage effects such as Lind›
beck and Snower (1998). It also allows gender differences to depend on something that
approximates of￿ce politics as well as productivity differences. Again, these considera›
tions are consistent with competitive forces determining the value of outside alternatives
but leaving a speci￿c surplus to distribute. Consider a workplace where hypothetically
all workers arrived one year earlier (thus seniority rises holding experience constant).
Workers interact and skills are reallocated within the ￿rm. The surplus changes and the
worker’s share of that surplus may go up or down because their relative seniority can go




ble production. The linear model is rejected, and most one›digit industries are estimated
to have signi￿cant coworker interactions. Allowing seniority to enter both bargaining
and technology provides only a slightly better ￿t than making seniority unproductive.
This model of co›worker interactions and seniority that is unproductive but relevant for
distributing joint surplus becomes our preferred speci￿cation. We explore further impli›
cations of relaxing linear separability across workers. In particular the joint production
model provides different interpretations of ￿rm›size and male›female wage differentials.
2. The Joint Production Economy
2.1 Workers and Workforces
In the model a workplace matches the usual de￿nition of a plant or establishment
3 Buhaietal. (2008) developabargainingmodelofturnover,seniorityandtenure. Their
model has linearly separable production across co›workers but sequential bargaining
between the ￿rm and arriving workers creates a relationship between wages and and
relative seniority. They also construct relative seniority from matched data although they
do not impose equilibrium restrictions from the model on the data.
4in employer›employee matched data sets. Namely, a workplace is a single physical site
which may comprise the whole ￿rm or one location of a multi›site ￿rm. Each workplace
produces a quantity of a single ￿nal good. It has an exogenously determined workforce
attached to it consisting of N workers. Worker n in the workforce has a 1 × P vector of
observedandexogenouscharacteristics, xn. The N×P matrix X containingtherowvectors
xn describes the workforce.4
Observedcharacteristicsofworkersshifttheirtalent. Aworkercontributestheirtalent
whichinteractswiththetalentsofcoworkersthroughatechnologythatdeterminesoutput.
Talent has both internal and external components. External (general) talent transfers to
other workplaces. Internal (speci￿c) talent is left behind if the worker leaves the current
workplace. Computing the optimal allocation of talent, which is how the mapping from
talent to output is completed, is simpler when the distribution of talents is smooth. With a
￿nite heterogeneous workforce, a smooth talent distribution can be created by assuming
that each worker provides not a point›valued talent but a talent distribution. 5
Assumption A1: Talent. A worker with characteristics xn has a talent distribution in
their current workplace denoted G(a;xnγ) with corresponding density g(a;xnγ). The vector
γ contains exogenous coef￿cients.
A1a. The index xγ is composed of internal and external components:
xγ
    
total
= xMγ
      
external
+ x(I − M)γ
      
internal,
(2)
where M is an exogenous idempotent P × P matrix.
A1b. A worker’s talent follows the exponential distribution: G(a;xγ) = 1 − e−ae
−xγ
.
4 In order to focus on the role of joint production, the relationships among workplaces
of a multi›site ￿rm are ignored.
5 One can interpret this assumption by supposing that the workplace sets allocation
rules to maximize expected revenue before worker talent is realized. Workers come in
to work repeatedly, drawing an amount of talent a from their own talent distribution.
Based on their draw they play an assigned role. In small workplaces where the daily
distribution of talent may diverge greatly from the expected distribution, a buffer stock of
the intermediate good would smooth output .
5The matrix M strips off the workplace›speci￿c characteristics of a worker leaving their
external characteristics that apply in all other workplaces. In the empirical speci￿cation
the columns of xn include functions of seniority (tenure) at the current workplace. A
worker who moves to another workplace has seniority reset to zero but keeps all other
characteristics. Forexample,ifcolumn 5containsseniorityandcolumn 6senioritysquared
then M wouldbetheorder P identitymatrixexceptthe 5thand 6thelementsofthediagonal
would be zero.
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of talents of two workers. Worker 2 is the more
able of the two. The talent distribution in the workplace is a vertical average of the two







Assuming that a worker’s talent follows the exponential distribution (A1b) is convenient
for the empirical analysis. The scalar log of expected talent, lnE[a|x] = ln(1/e−xγ) = xγ,
plays the same role as ￿skill" in the typical human capital model with linearly separable
technology. Since the exponential distribution is a one›parameter distribution a larger
value of xγ is ￿rst›order stochastic dominant over a smaller value (as seen in Figure 1).
In equilibrium the value of outside alternatives is a monotonic function of a single index
xMγ. We can associate xγ with the usual Mincer›like earnings regression in special cases
of the model.
2.2 Workplaces
The workforce uses a technology Q(Xγ;C), which expresses the value of per›worker
output net of a ￿xed percentage of revenue taken by the owner of the technology. The
technology can depend on workplace characteristics not embodied in the workforce (such
as industry and location) and contained in the vector C. Total net revenue generated at a
workplace equals N × {per›worker revenue} = NQ(Xγ;C).6 The technology requires that
6 The interpretation of Q() is discussed further in the section on bargaining.









workers be assigned to one of two tasks. Task assignments are conditioned on a, so a
worker spends some time in both tasks.7
Task 1 can be interpreted as primary production and task 2 as managing or secondary
production. The tasks are ordered recursively as in Rosen (1982).8 Primary produc›
tion involves no interaction with other workers and relies only on the worker’s talent.
Managerial work requires the manager’s talent and primary output.
Workers are indifferent to their task assignment. Task 1 output has no value outside
theworkplaceandcanbesplitandcombinedirrespectiveofworkeridentities. Task2uses
as inputs both talent and task 1 output. Output from other workplaces cannot be used as
input to task 2, and task 2 workers only care about the amount of task 1 output they get to
7 A given worker is not dedicated to one task but switches between tasks according to
the realized value of their talent. The proportion time spent managing varies with worker
characteristics xn as it shifts the distribution g(a;xnγ).
8 It is possible to extend the model to more than two tasks (or levels). Information on
assignment within workplace is not always available in administrative data, and without
it the value added by allowing for more tasks is unclear.
7use. They are indifferent to the talents and identities of the subordinates who produce the
task 1 output. Together these assumptions lead to an internal market for primary (task 1)
output in which only the overall distribution of talent matters not the number of workers
or their individual talent distributions.
Assumption A2: Technology. Let ϕ(a) ∈ [0,1] denote a fraction of the talent a assigned to
task 2 and 1 − ϕ(a) the fraction assigned to task 1. Let q1(a) be the amount of task 1 output
as an input to talent assigned to task 2. Let Iβ = 1 if β ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise. Then:
A2a. A worker with realized talent a in task 1 produces
Q1(a;β) =
{
a if β ≥ 0
a−β if β < 0
= aIβ(1+β)−β.






1 if β ≥ 0
a1+βq−β
1 if β < 0
= a1+(1−Iβ)βq(Iβ−1)β
1
For all values of β the task›speci￿c technologies are Cobb›Douglas in inputs and addi›
tiveacrossworkersinthesametask. Thetechnologyhasdistinctpropertiesdependingon
whether β is above, below or exactly zero. For negative β the task 1 technology is concave
in a and the task 2 output exhibits constant returns to scale. For positive β the task 1
technology is linear in a and task 2 output exhibits increasing returns to scale. For β = 0
the task 2 technology does not depend on input from lower levels and both technologies
are linear in a.
Task 2 output is added up across workers and scaled by a coef￿cient A > 0 to generate
revenue. The scaling coef￿cient includes the output price and the net contribution of
￿xed factors of production. Since workers are indifferent to their assignments, we can
associate the overall technology with the revenue produced by revenue›maximizing task
assignments:
De￿nition D1: Workplace Arrangements. An optimal workplace arrangement is a pair
{ϕ⋆(a),q⋆
1(a)}ofmeasurablefunctionsthatmaximizethevalueofoutputsubjecttofeasibility



















Let Q(Xγ;C) denote the value of output at the optimal arrangement.
Theconstraint (5) issimplyaconditionfortheproductionprocesstobefeasibleinthat
the workplace must allocate talent internally so that the supply of task 1 output equals
the demand coming from task 2. Less talented workers have a comparative advantage at
task 1 because more talented workers assigned to task 2 are better able to combine their
talent with output of others.
Implication I1: Task Assignment. Let λ denote the Lagrangian on (5). Then:
I1a. Optimal task assignment is a cut›off rule. That is, all talent above a number
 a(λ;β,A,X) is assigned to task 2 and all talent below is assigned to task 1:
ϕ⋆(a) =
{
0 if a ≤  a(λ;β,A,X)
1 if a >  a(λ;β,A,X).
(6)
I1b. Given the technology the cut›off  a is monotonic in λ and depends on X only
through λ.
I1c. For β = 0 the technology is linearly additive across workers. For β ̸= 0 worker





is a continuous function of β, A, and γ on their permitted ranges.
The form of  a under the different cases of β are provided in the Appendix. Any talent
devoted to primary output takes away from saleable output, but for β ̸= 0 manager output
is constrained by the internal supply of primary output. Holding constant the technology,
a larger value of λ indicates that the workforce is more ￿top heavy," because two effects
that move together: ￿rst, with greater λ the marginal task 2 assignment moves into task 1









( a increases); second, each worker working in task 2 faces a higher shadow price for input
and gets less task 1 output to use (q1(a) decreases).
Figure 2a and Figure 2b illustrate optimal task assignment when β > 0 and β < 0,
respectively. Given the distribution of talent g(a;Xfγ), the values of  a and λ are set to
equate total Q1(a) to total q1(a). Per›worker output is the expected value of Q2(a). In
the case β = 0 primary production becomes unnecessary. All talent is devoted to the
managerial task. While exponential talent (A1) is maintained throughout the analysis,
the ￿rst three properties of optimal task assignment require only the technology and a
continuous unbounded support of talents. The assignments under each case of β are
described fully in the Appendix.
2.3 Marginal Worker Contributions
Adding or subtracting a worker from a workplace changes N and shifts the talent
distribution G(a;Xfγ). There is a direct impact on primary supply and demand and ￿nal













output, even if  af and λf were held constant. The new distribution changes optimal task
assignment. To describe marginal contribution we introduce some additional notation.
De￿nition D2: Talent and Value Added. Let X∼x
f denote the addition (concatenation) of
a worker with external characteristics x to workplace f. Thus X∼x
f is a (Nf + 1) × P matrix
with a last row equal to x. The value marginal product (revenue) of x in f is:











than a less talented worker. By how much depends on the existing talent distribution.
Although we treat as exogenous the composition of workforces, we brie￿y consider what
the task assignment model says about matching of coworkers. First, when worker talents
arecomplementsinthetechnology(ormoregenerallysupermodularityasin Milgromand
Shannon 1994), it is well know that assortative matching occurs in the long run (Becker











1973). The most talented workers will work with each other, the least with each other and
so forth. However, it is also known that assignment models can break supermodularity
(Kremer and Maskin 1996 and Legros and Newman 2002). In the model used here,
primary output is complementary to work in the managerial task, but outputs within
tasks are substitutes for each other. Since workers spend some time in each task there
is a range of overall rates of substitution across coworkers. Workers who do mostly one
task are substitutes for each other. They complement workers who spend more time in
the other task. Thus, whatever the equilibrium assignment of coworkers is with such a
technology it does not exhibit perfect segregation by skill.
Figure3 illustratesthisbycomparingthetalentdistributionsoftwoworkforces, X and
X′. The former is more talented than the later because its talent distribution stochastically
dominates: G(a;Xγ) < G(a;X′γ) for all a. Because workforce X has more talent it has
greater internal demand for Q1. This results in a greater value of  a (and greater shadow
price λ) than for X′. The talented workers in X are forced to spend a large fraction of
12their time doing basic tasks because not enough co›workers are available to do these
tasks. Meanwhile, workplace X′ lacks high ￿yers to transform task 1 output. Now
consider adding either a more talented worker with talent index xγ or a less talented
one, x′γ < xγ. Workplace X′ can potentially out›bid X for worker x because hiring the
better worker relaxes their constraint on leadership/management talent. Meanwhile,
workforce X may prefer to add x′ in order to produce task 1 output, freeing up time
for their workers to engage in task 2 production. That is, the comparative and absolute
advantages of two workers may differ: VMP X(x) > VMPX(x′) and VMPX′(x) > VMPX′(x′),
but VMPX(x) − VMPX′(x) < VMPX(x′) − VMPX′(x′). The more talented worker has an
absolute advantage over the less talented worker regardless of the existing workforce, but
endogenoustaskassignmentcangivethelesstalentedworkerthecomparativeadvantage
in a talented workforce. This complexity disappears when coworkers do not interact, as
the next result establishes.
ImplicationI2: Separability. Whenthetechnologyparameter β equals0then λ = 0. Also,
VMP is separable across workers and log›linear in observables: lnVMPf(x) = lnA + xγ.
A special case of the technology is the usual log›linear form for VMP that supports
the ubiquitous log›linear human capital earnings equation of Mincer (1) . We would
arrive at Mincer’s equation with the assumption that workers are paid their VMP at their
current￿rm(regardlessofworker›workplacespeci￿ccapital). Thejointproductionmodel
generalizes the linearly separable framework used for most empirical models of wages.
2.4 Wage Determination
Wage determination can be fairly straightforward when talents enter a linearly ad›
ditive technology shared by all workplaces (β = 0 and A constant). For example, in a
competitive equilibrium with free mobility and no speci￿c human capital ( M = I) workers
are paid their value marginal product. Implication I2 shows that this model generates a
Mincer wage equation under these assumptions.
13Many considerations make wage determination less simple, including joint produc›
tion and workplace›speci￿c talents considered here. Now a worker’s VMP de￿ned in
(7) depends on the talents of their potential coworkers and is computed by re›solving
the task assignment problem of the existing workplace. In a joint production economy
with exogenous workforces there is no single VMP to determine the wage. One way to
determine wages is to consider them the outcome of a multilateral bargaining process for
wages within a workplace. To simplify matters, we assume any worker’s departure de›
stroys the workplace. In this case, the two›person Nash solution extends to a multilateral
situation ( Lensberg 1988).9
Assumption A3: Bargaining. Wages are determined according to multi›lateral bargain›
ing between the workforce and the employer.
A3a. The employer’s bargaining power relative to the workforce is constant across
all workplaces, and its outside alternative is zero (shutdown with no scrap
value).
A3b. A worker with characteristics x has an outside alternative with value V (xMγ),
which appears in the vector V (XMγ).
A3c. Workers bargain among themselves over their share of the overall surplus.
Relative bargaining power depends on workplace›speci￿c talent. That is, the
N × 1 vector of weights summing to 1 equals

(





The N × 1 vector ι contains 1’s, and ψ is a vector of coef￿cients that relate
seniority to relative bargaining power.
Withemployershavingzero›valuedthreatpoints (A3a)andthetotalbargainingpower
of the workforce is constant (A3b), irrespective of the number and characteristics of the
9 Multilateral bargaining is a complex situation when agents are heterogeneous and
they can form sub›coalitions in order to escape agents who contribute less to the surplus
(e.g. Krishna and Serrano 1996 and Stole and Zwiebel 1996).
14workers, two simpli￿cations occur that make the equilibrium model feasible to estimate
on a large data set.
ImplicationI3: SeparableBargaining. Under (A3) theemployerandtheworkforceeach
receive the same proportion of total revenue at any feasible workplace. Furthermore:
I3a. Without loss of generality, the technology Q() can be interpreted as the work›
force’s share of revenue by re›de￿ning parameter A to include factors that
account for the workforce’s bargaining power.
I3b. The bargaining allocation among coworkers can be separated from the bar›
gaining outcome between the employer and its workforce.
Recall from Assumption A1 that Xγ is the vector of indices for total talents and XMγ
is the vector of general talents of a workforce. X(I −M) is the matrix of workplace›speci￿c
shifters of talent. The ability to capture surplus is a linear combination of these factors,






(xi − xj)(I − M)ψ
]
. Consider two special cases. When ψ is a zero vector then bargaining
power is equal across workers;  = ι/N. Because outside alternatives do not depend on
seniority a person’s wage will be affected by seniority only through the technological
contribution of the skills. But this contribution is shared with coworkers through the
bargaining process. Now suppose ψ is zero except for the coef￿cient on seniority. As
that coef￿cient increases it shifts bargaining power to more senior workers. In the limit
the vector  becomes an indicator vector for the worker with the most seniority. All the
power accrues to the most senior worker who pays coworkers their outside alternatives
and captures the surplus for themselves.
De￿nition D3: Nash Payroll. Denote the vector of outside values as V (XMγ) and its
average as  V (XMγ) ≡ 1
N
∑N
n=1 V (xnMγ) = ι′V (XMγ)/N. Denote the total surplus generated
by the workplace as S (Xγ,V (XMγ)) ≡ N
[
Q(Xγ;C) −  V (XMγ)
]
. A workplace is feasible if it
produces a surplus: S (Xγ,V (XMγ)) ≥ 0. For a feasible workplace the multilateral Nash
15payroll is a vector W⋆ = [W⋆
n] that solves










Wn ≤ NQ(Xγ;C). (9)
Implication I4: The Nash Payroll in a Joint Production Workplace.
W⋆
(












X (I − M)ψ
)
. (10)
That is, the Nash payroll is the vector version of the usual ‘surplus sharing’ result.
Four channels generate wage variation as summarized in Figure 4. The Nash payroll
depends on technology, talent, outside alternatives (as a function of general talents), and
internal talents. In particular, the wages paid to any individual depends on both their
own characteristics and the characteristics of their coworkers.
2.5 Outside Alternatives
Since the model is static and assignment of workers to workplaces is taken as given,
we make auxiliary assumptions to pin down the value of outside alternatives. We derive
anequilibriumvaluefor V ()assumingaworker’salternativeistodrawatrandomanother
existingworkplaceandjoinitsworkforce. Addingtheworkershiftstheoptimalallocation
of talents in that workplace. Since there is already an implicit "stage 1" bargain between
the workforce and the employer the outside workers has a different status than current
workers. This secondary market is a one›time alternative, so a moving worker’s outside
alternativeisassumed tobe aconstant VU. If thematch withtherandomly selectedsecond
workplace does not succeed, the worker expects to be unemployed at an exogenous value
VU.
Assumption A4: Hypothetical Alternatives. The economy consists of three stages:
S0. Each workforce f solves its assignment problem. Given V (z) its feasibility is
determined.
16Figure 4. Wage Variation Within and Between Workplaces
Source Index Path to W ⋆ Type
Internal X(I − M)ψ Power: (X(I − M)ψ) Relative
External XMγ Alternatives: V (XMγ) Individual
Total Xγ Productivity: Q(Xγ;C) Joint
Sectoral C Technology: β,A Exogenous
S1. Each worker is hypothetically matched to a randomly selected feasible work›
force and bargains to join it ignoring other possible transitions. The existing
workforce acts as a coalition bargaining with the hypothetical worker who has
power d ∈ [0,1]. The threat point for the workplace is to produce according to
the outcome in stage 1. The threat point of the new worker is unemployment
with an exogenous value VU.
S2. Unemployed workers receive VU. Feasible workplaces from the previous two
steps produce. Workers are paid according to the Nash payroll.
This timing links wages with joint production in other workplaces. It uses a friction
(only one randomly chosen workplace can be contacted) to avoid the problem of ￿nding
the optimal alternative for a given worker. It retains the assumption of bargaining among
workers and assumes that arriving workers are evaluated according to their contribution
to the workplace’s surplus. With d = 1 the existing workforce extracts no surplus from
a hypothetical worker who attempts to join the workplace, and with d = 0 the worker
simply gets VU from any hypothetical match. However we do not reconcile hypothetical
bargaining with outsiders and the make up of existing workforces. That is, at some point
in the past current coworkers arrived as outsiders and became insiders. That type of
dynamic analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
If all workplaces are feasible then all workers receive at least their outside alterna›
tive in their current workplaces. None would strictly prefer to follow through with the
hypothetical search step S1.
17Implication I5: De￿ne an equilibrium as a function V (z) such that all workplaces are
feasible in stage S0 of (A4) and no worker strictly prefers a random match in S1 to their
current workplace. Let





[V MPf′(z) − VU]I{V MPf′(z)≥VU}, (11)
with VMPf(z) de￿ned in (7) and d de￿ned in S1 of (A4).
I5a. V (z) is an equilibrium if all workplaces are feasible under it.
I5b. For VU and d suf￿ciently close to 0 any workplace will be feasible under V (z).
In other words, we consider the equilibrium such that the outside threat points of
coworkersistheirexpectedpayofffromthebargainingtojoinarandomoutsideworkforce.
This equilibrium is typically not unique because workplace›speci￿c talent drives a wedge
between the VMP in the current and outside workplaces. Coworkers can capture some
of the gap without violating other equilibrium conditions. When d = VU = 0 all workers
prefer to work in their current ￿rm than search. For a given technology and a given
set of workforces ￿nding an equilibrium can be assured by setting the values of Vu and
d suf￿ciently close to 0. Higher values of either parameter change the distribution of
wages by shifting wages from the surplus sharing component to the outside alternative
component of the Nash payroll.
As with many equilibrium concepts this generalizes the textbook ￿wage = VMP"
result. For example, consider a linear (β = 0) homogeneous technology, no value of
unemployment (VU = 0), full external surplus extraction (h = 1), and no internal talents
(M = I). Then V (z) equals the positive unique VMP of each talent level and the surplus
generated by each workplace would be zero. Thus W⋆ = V (z) = V MP and all workplaces
would be just feasible. This special case serves as a benchmark for the joint production
technology. Inourempiricalanalysisweallowthetechnologyparameter Atodifferacross
industries. So even with β = 0 there can be a surplus generated for workplaces in some
industries.
182.6 Solution Method and Empirical Considerations
Thegoaloftheempiricalanalysisistocomparepredictedpayrollstoobservedpayroll
vectors, denoted Wo
f for f = 1,...,F. In the model wages are deterministic. To match the
data we introduce measurement error. The observed payroll is the equilibrium payroll
W⋆ plus an iid normal error vector:10 Wo = W⋆ + ϵ, and ϵ ∼ N(0,σ2I).
The set of workforce and workplace characteristics is treated as observed and exoge›
nous (as is the masking matrix M). Optimal task assignments and equilibrium outside
alternatives are treated as unobserved. 11 We allow the production coef￿cient A and the
exponent β to differ across industries. The vector of free parameters in the most ￿exible
speci￿cation is written:
θ ≡ (A(C) β (C) γ ψ h VU σ ). (12)
For a parameter vector θ the optimal task assignment is computed within each workplace,
which determines the total share of output available to the workforce, Q. To compute V (z),
each workplace in the sample has a randomly selected worker drawn from the whole
sample attached to it. That worker’s seniority was stripped from X. The result is z = XMγ.
Optimal assignments and output were computed for each workplace, ￿rst for the actual
workforce and then after inserting the hypothetical worker into the workforce. Letting
Q and Qh denote the actual and hypothetical outputs, the added workers share of the





10 Typically wages are modeled with a log›linear speci￿cation. This creates a tendency
to equate the average of log›wages with predicted log›wages. With wages skewed to the
rightthemodelwouldtendtounder›predictaveragewagesinlevels. However,themodel
has a theoretical condition on average wage levels within workplaces, not average in logs.
Imposing the condition that workplaces be feasible (average revenue exceeds average
outside alternatives) may bias the estimate of outside alternatives in order to make up for
the shortfall in average wages. So we employ the additive error. This means our linear
technology is mostly closely related to a Mincer equation of the form W0 = Aexγ + ϵ which
would be estimated with non›linear least squares.
11 Thisistrueforthedatausedhere. Whentherolesworkersplayinsidetheirworkplaces
are available the model generates a probability that a worker with characteristics x is
labeled a manager in their workplace equals the proportion of time they spend in task 2,
exp{− aexp{−xγ}}.
19The result is F observations of z and v(z). These were collected and v(z) was regressed on
powers of z:
V (z) = ^ E[v(z)|z] = b0 + b1z + b2z2 + b3z3. (13)
Since F is large, z is a one›dimensional index, and V (z) is monotonic in z, this regression
closely matches the conditional expectation of v(z). It retains continuity of W⋆ in θ since
V MPf(z) and v(z) are continuous in z which in turn is continuous in θ.
With total output and outside alternatives computed, the log›likelihood for ￿rm f
comes from the normal density of the implied error terms: lf(^ θ;W0
f ,Xf) = −0.5/σ − ^ ϵ′^ ϵ/σ2,






the characteristics of each worker has a big impact on the talent distribution. On the other
hand,withoutthedisciplineofapositivesurplusthemodelcouldpredictworkersarepaid
less than their outside alternative. To balance these concerns we penalize the likelihood
for negative surpluses in workplaces with more than ￿ve workers. The overall objective
is therefore:











As discussed in the introduction, we use our estimated joint production equilibrium
to reconsider how wages, seniority and other worker characteristics are related. A worker
isaffectedbytheirownseniority›drivenproductivityandtheneteffectoftheircoworkers.
Theseniority coef￿cientsestimated onindividual dataalone picks upthe compositeeffect
of all workplace seniority (even if individual turnover is exogenous). Further, under joint
technology and multilateral allocation of the surplus, a worker only gets a share of their
contribution to output. The equilibrium restriction isolates the effect of observables on
productivity in the current ￿rm from their effect on productivity in other ￿rms that raises
20outside alternatives.
The share/power effect of seniority is disentangled from the productivity effect
through the fact that total payrolls are observed in matched data. Firms with more
senior workers should have greater overall payrolls, all else constant. As seniority affects
productivity the effect is seen in the total payroll (the sum of the payroll vector W⋆). Since
seniority is left at the workplace door it has no direct effect on the outside alternative V (z),
which is estimated through the relationship between payroll and general skill z = MXγ.
The effect of seniority on surplus sharing is seen in the distribution of the payroll (the
correlation between W⋆ and the elements of X related to seniority, (I −M)X)). A large rep›
resentative sample of workplaces and their fully described workforces provides variation
in total payroll (the productivity channel) and individual pay (the distributive channel)
which separately identi￿es these effects in equilibrium.
This identi￿cation strategy is based on an explicit parameterized model of joint pro›
duction that follows the literature on task assignment within organizations. The model
alsoincludesanestedmodeloflinear, individualisticproductionwhichsupportsthestan›
dardwageequation (1) . Thecomplextechnologyin (A2) ensuresthespeciallinearcaseis
in the interior of the support of β. Inference about joint versus individualistic production
becomes a standard test of the null hypothesis β = 0 in the interior of the parameter space.
In contrast, working with data on individuals alone without their coworkers leaves total
payroll unobserved. It also leaves relative seniority unobserved even with panel data.
Thus the joint production parameter β is not identi￿ed from that kind of data, and in light
of our model most models of wages maintain and leave untested the assumption β = 0.
By the same token, this application of equilibrium task assignment model to matched
data set maintains assumptions that can be relaxed with, say, individual›level panel data.
So our analysis is a counter›balance to the historical focus on individualistic models of




Beginning with the universe of Norwegian workplaces (both public and private)
and people aged 16›75, attachment to an employer is based on the person’s status as of
November 30, 1997. Matching is based on a personal identi￿cation number assigned to
all residents of Norway. Employers are identi￿ed with a unique number for the ￿rm and
a unique tax number for the plant or establishment. Because the current analysis is static,




of the workplace, which is a variable for each worker. In some cases the industry code is
missing, and in others workers in the same workplace are coded with different industries.
Theindustryoftheworkplaceisde￿nedasthemodeindustryassociatedwithitsworkers.
If more than one mode exists, or if the industry code is missing completely the workplace
is placed in a separate ￿no code" category. Some smaller industries are combined with
larger ones to de￿ne 8 distinct categories listed in Table 1.
3.1.3 Earnings
Administrativedatarelatedtopublicpensioncreditsrecordtotalannual1997earnings
in all jobs and any unemployment insurance bene￿ts. Denote this amount as EARN,
expressed in thousands of 1997 Norwegian kroner, approximately US$150 in 1997. Let
nu and ne denote months of unemployment and full›time education in 1997 (merged in
from another administrative database). UI bene￿ts received are approximately 0.6 times
monthly earnings. And we assume that monthly earnings on any jobs held in 1997
22either earlier or later than the November job are the same as earnings on that job. These
assumptions and approximations imply EARN = (12−nu −ne)Wo +0.6neW o. Then monthly
earnings on the November job are
Wo
n ≡ EARN
12 − ne − 0.4nu.
For the vast majority of workers Wo is simply one›twelfth of their total 1997 earnings on
their November job. The other assumptions come into play only if short jobs were held
before or after the November job and only if the worker left school or spent some time
unemployed during the year.
3.1.4 Hours, Experience and Seniority
Usual work hours per week are based on the data reported to the national insurance
authorities mainly for sick›leaves and calculation of unemployment bene￿ts. Work hours
are described by three categories, and the worker’s characteristic include an indicator for
full›time.
Besides an indicator for females, the other elements of x consist of indicators for cate›
gories of years of schooling, merged from another administrative database (that actually
contains detailed six›digit codes for both type and amount of education). The row of
characteristics has P = 16 columns corresponding to the variables listed in Table 2. The
external vector has 6 columns of zeros knocked out by M.
3.1.5 The Sample
In the original data, 1,719,983 people are associated with an employer. The sample is
reduced by eliminating workers (and their workplace) with inconsistent job start dates,
extreme earnings (W o < .1 and Wo > 1000), and other missing variables. This eliminates
10,254 workplaces and 452,230 people. Next all workplaces with a single worker are
eliminated, which eliminates 38,533 workplaces/observations. The result is 1,229,219
people working at 103,840 workplaces. From this a 20% sample of workplaces is drawn,
basedon20,542workplacesand247,521workers. Thetypicalworkerhas11coworkers. A
23second20%samplewasdrawntobeusedforout›of›samplecomparisonoftheequilibrium
predictions of various model speci￿cations.
Table 1 summarizes the data by workplace. The number of ￿no›code" workplaces
is small except for very small workplaces for which con￿icting industry coding is likely
to occur. Small workplaces are the norm in all industries. Only in manufacturing and
services is the percentage in 51›100 range even close to 10%. The last column shows that
over half of all multi›worker workplaces in Norway have 2›5 workers and nearly 90%
have 20 or fewer. For understanding the technology of joint production small workplaces
are potentially very important.
Table 2 summarizes worker characteristics. Average monthly earnings are nearly
NOK 19000 with a coef￿cient of variation of 65%. Women make up 45% of the workforce,
and 76% of workers work full time. The average worker has 13 years of actual experience
and 5.43 years of potential seniority. If full›time is a permanent status in a workplace then
current full›time workers have acquired 4.434 / .76 = 5.84 years of seniority on average.
Part›time workers have acquired only 4.15 calendar years of seniority (computed from
the other numbers in the table). The modal education category is 10 or 11 years followed
closely by 12 or 13 years.
Table3 showsthejointdistributionofindustryandselectedworkercharacteristicwith
common patterns. Services are dominated by women and have the lowest proportion of
full›time workers. Construction is dominated by men and full›time workers. Agricul›
ture/Mining/Elect. has the longest seniority, but transport has the most experience but
the least seniority. FIRE and Services have the most educated workers.
Table 4 examines the variation in coworker characteristics within and across work›
places. For each worker the mean among coworkers was computed for selected variables.
The variation in these coworker means was then decomposed between and within work›
places. In each case variation within workplaces is much lower than between workplaces.
Notonlydoearningsvarymoreacrossworkplacesthanwithin, sodoeducation, seniority,
24experience, full›timestatusandsex. Thefactthatbetween›workplacestandarddeviations
are greater than the overall values re￿ects the positive correlation within workplaces,
which is reported directly as the correlation between the worker value of the variables
and their coworkers’ mean. For example, the correlation of .54 for the female indicator
shows that workplaces are partially segregated by sex. All the correlations are strongly
positive. This partial assortative sorting suggests that models of earnings not based on
matched data overstate the direct impact individual characteristics have on VMP.
3.2 Estimates
Table 5 reports estimates of two versions of the linear technology which sets the key
parameter β to 0. They are the equivalent to a Mincer wage regression because they
implement the usual assumption that workers are paid their VMP. This happens because
they capture the whole share of their outside surplus ( h = 1 = 1 − VU) and the mask matrix
M equals the identity matrix which means that all characteristics including seniority are
relatedtogeneralskills. Or, anequivalentinterpretationisworkerscaptureallthesurplus
fromtheirseniorityandemployerscapturenoneeventhoughtherespeci￿cnatureofthese
skills means there is no competitive pressure on it. The difference between the columns
is whether the external market is the whole economy (A constant) or the workplace’s
industry (A variable).
The estimates of γ follow the typical pattern of a wage regression. Women earn less
than men; earnings are concave in experience and concave in seniority with a smaller
range. Wages are slightly less sensitive in seniority for women and highly educated
workers. The return to education implied by the coef￿cients on the categories is also
typical. For example, using the mid›points of the 12›13 and 14›16 year categories yields
a return to one year’s schooling of 0.08. The model that restricts industries to have equal
output coef￿cients is rejected with a χ2
7 log›likelihood ratio of 7346=›2(694252›694579).
Table6 reportsestimatesofourpreferredspeci￿cationofthejointtechnologymodelin
25which industry›speci￿c βs and the bargaining power shifters ψ are estimated but internal
talent (seniority) is assumed to have no affect on productivity. This model ￿ts the data
signi￿cantly better than the linear model (the log likelihood ratio test statistic is over
2000.) Overall many of the parameters follow patterns similar to the linear model. Many
of the standard errors are small but of the same order of magnitude as those on regression
coef￿cients on the same large data set.
3.2.1 Power or Productivity?
Table 7 summarizes ￿ve different speci￿cations including the preferred speci￿cation
in Table 6 and the unrestricted linear model in Table 5. Next to that model in Table 7
is a joint technology model in which bargaining power is constant. Each worker gets
an equal share of the surplus. Allowing for interactions in the workplace but keeping
power equal signi￿cantly improves the ￿t over the unrestricted linearly separable spec›
i￿cation. The log›likelihood ratio statistic is 2473.5. The next column in Table 7 allows
the linear seniority terms in the bargaining vector ψ to be non›zero. Freeing these four
parameters improves the likelihood (test statistic is 1277.9) while not changing the senior›
ity/productivity parameters greatly. Next comes the power›only speci￿cation already
presented. This speci￿cation does not nest the linear power model since seniority has no
productive aspect. It has four fewer free parameters yet results in an improved ￿t, which
is statistically signi￿cant as the likelihood ratio is 515.7. This suggests that seniority’s role
in total output is very limited. Eliminating it altogether while allowing relative power to
be non›linear is preferred.
Finally the last column presents the model that frees up all the parameters. This spec›
i￿cation nests the other joint technology models and accordingly has the best likelihood
value. The improvement over the preferred speci￿cation is very modest given the enor›
mous sample size and the steady changes when freeing up other sets of parameters. The
χ2 statistics for the test of the preferred model is a mere 32, which is formally signi￿cant
26at the 1% level (the critical value with six degrees of freedom is 16.81). However, the
parameter values for the nested model are somewhat problematic. For fulltime workers
years with the workplace affects talent adversely throughout the career (the sum of the
both the linear and quadratic components of γ are negative). It is dif￿cult to argue that
speci￿c talents actually detract from total output throughout the career. A simpler ex›
planation is that the data do not provide enough variation in total payroll and payroll
distribution to separately identify the productive and distributional roles of seniority.
Perhaps a more restrictive speci￿cation would provide coherent estimates of both effects,
but the two cases presented in Table 7 suggest that seniority would still have a very small
productivity effect. So we retain as our preferred speci￿cation that the seniority›related
coef￿cients in γ are set to zero but ψ is estimated.
Further evidence against the nesting model in the ￿nal column of Table 7 is provided
by applying estimates to a separate 20% sample of workplaces. The parameters and
the equilibrium value of V (z) from the estimation sample are used to compute the Nash
payroll for each workplace in the holdout sample. The same likelihood comparisons
are made for the holdout sample. The results are similar test statistics, but the linear
technology and linear seniority speci￿cations ￿t worse in the holdout sample. The equal
power and preferred speci￿cation ￿t better (than in the estimation sample). In particular,
the likelihood ratio test does not reject the preferred speci￿cation in the holdout sample.
Thissuggeststhatthejointtechnologyprovidesarealimprovementoverthelinearmodel,
but allowing seniority to be both productive and distributive leads to over￿tting because
the productive channel is extremely weak. Based on this evidence we now focus on
the preferred speci￿cation with joint production and seniority›related bargaining power
and how its explanation of the data compares to the rejected but more common linear
speci￿cation.
3.2.2 Variation Within and Between Workplaces
27Table 8 compares the variance of wages in the data, the preferred joint estimates, and
the linear technology estimates. As with all wage regressions a sizeable fraction of wage
variation is unexplained (and is accounted for by measurement error in this analysis).
Both models have predicted wage variation of about 58% of that in the data with the
better ￿t of the joint model amounting to about .004% change. This is not surprising
since the joint model introduces only a handful of new parameters to ￿t a quarter of a
million observations. Despite ending up with similar overall variances the two models
apportion it quite differently between and within workplaces. The joint model attributes
a higher amount of variance between workplaces and less within. Within›workplace
variation includes variation in the external returns to general skills ( V (z)) and variation
across workers in their share of the surplus (Sπ). The linear model creates a surplus only
throughinter›industrytechnologydifferences. Soallwithin›workplacevariationisdueto
V (z). Eachofthevariancesof V (z)inthejointmodelareabout80›85%ofthecorresponding
values in the linear model. The joint model attributes less variation to external factors,
leaving surplus dividends to explain the rest.
3.3 The Wage Distribution and Technology
3.3.1 Seniority when Coworkers Matter
To illustrate the role of seniority we computed the response to increasing seniority
by ￿ve years for one worker in each workplace. The worker chosen was the one with
the lowest amount of seniority (the relative rookie). This change affects productivity
and surplus in the linear technology and bargaining in the joint technology estimate.
With joint production the rookie’s wage change depends on their characteristics and their
co›workers. There is a spillover effect for coworkers because their relative seniority is
changed. The ￿rst panel of Figure 5 shows the distribution of impacts on the rookie
whose seniority changed. It is represented by the one standard deviation ban around
the mean change (over workplaces) as a function of the rookie’s initial seniority. For







































these workers the typical changes are not that much different under the two joint and
linear model. The variation is a little larger for new workers under the joint technology
but smaller for old workplaces (in which the rookie already has substantial tenure). The
downward trend re￿ects the concave seniority pro￿les under both technologies. The
second panel of Figure 5 shows the spillover to other workers whose own seniority is
￿xed but their relative bargaining strength changes. This effect is much smaller that the
direct impact, because it is spread over N −1 coworkers. But we see a much greater range
under the joint technology then the linear one, in which only the industry›speci￿c surplus
is available for sharing.
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Now consider how the joint technology assumption changes the explanation for dif›
ferences in average wages between men and women. The linear estimates in Table 5
attribute a 20% difference in productivity between men and women, all else constant. 12
Women also bene￿t from seniority less than men (a signi￿cant but not large difference).
The coef￿cients on the interaction between experience and gender is not signi￿cant (recall
that we use a measure of actual experience based on pension points. The joint technology
estimates are not that different in magnitude, except the seniority effect in ψ is larger, and
the experience differential is now signi￿cant.
However, Figure 6 shows that the these differences feed through to wages through
12 H￿geland and Klette (1999) also study gender and experience wage differentials
using measures of productivity available for a subset of the ￿rms in our broader sample
and a linearly separable interpretation of productivity.
30different channels. The ￿gure shows experience pro￿les for men and women (so both the
direct effect of gender and differences in other characteristics are in play). The connected
lines are observed average wages and the wage differential is apparent. The top of the
blue shaded areas are the average predicted wages under the preferred joint technology
estimates. Forbothmenandwomenthemodelpredictsslowergrowthwhenexperienceis
lowthaninthedata. Thebottomoftheblueshadedareaistheaveragevalueof V (z)forthe
people of that gender and experience level. We see that the pro￿le of outside alternatives
for men grows much quicker than for women and peaks in mid career. The size of the
shaded area is therefore the average share of workplace›speci￿c surplus. While outside
alternatives account for most wage growth the share component of total wages grows for
men over their careers. For women the share is nearly constant. This is due to the smaller
effect of seniority for women. By contrast, the linear technology estimates have almost no
surplus, and that which exists is solely due to industry differentials. That gap is shown
in red in Figure 6 on top of the surplus from the joint technology surplus. The somewhat
larger surplus for women is then due to industry differences and concentrations in Table
3. Thus, the joint technology estimates attribute some of the gender gap to workplace
politics biased against women, the effect of which is most prominent in mid career.
Figure 7 shows the impact of gender differentials by considering a counterfactual that
gives each worker a gender value of 0.5. That is, it makes the workforce neuter, raising
talent for women and lowering it for men. Under a linear homogeneous technology
overall mean log›productivity would be quite similar, except that women made up only
45% of the workforce. Under joint technology the whole workplace talent distribution
shifts and the optimal task assignment changes. We compute the equilibrium response
of V (z) and display the same values as in Figure 6. The resulting experience pro￿les
follow similar shapes and reduces but does not eliminate gender differences under both
technologies.
The differences do not disappear since men and women differ in other characteristics
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and these are left constant. For men the predicted values are nearly identical under the
joint and linear technology. However, for women a visible gap between the linear and
joint wages appears, with joint wage predictions below the outside alternative V (z) under
the linear technology. This is somewhat unexpected. At one level women should gain
more than men from neutering the workforce. Women become more productive and tend
to work with more women than men. Men become less productive and tend to work with
more men than women. Thus without industrial differences in technology one would
expect spillover affects to push female wages in the counterfactual above the linear wage
pro￿le. This does not happen because women tend to work in industries where there is
less interaction between coworkers. Thus they gain less from the spillover effects than
men lose (on average).
3.3.3 Workplace Size Differentials











0 500 1000 1500 2000
nwrk
Wobs W* V(z)








0 500 1000 1500 2000
nwrk
Fitted values Manufacturing FIRE
Average Surplus by Size
Figure 8 displays another aspect of the wage distribution. For the preferred speci￿›
cation, predicted wages (W⋆) and outside alternatives V (XMγ) are averaged by workforce
size, Nf. The resulting wage›size pro￿le is displayed after smoothing. Recall that the
model exhibits constant returns to scale in Nf. The predicted pro￿le tracks the observed
rising pro￿le. This explanation of the ￿rms size wage pro￿le (Oi and Idson 1999) is partly
based on differences in observable characteristics between large and small workforces
(education and experience included). Changes in observed characteristics of individuals
are captured by the slope of V (). Outside alternatives rise quickly for workers in small
workplacesbut￿attenoutmorequicklythanpayrolls. Butthedisplayedpro￿leofoutside
alternatives shows the gap goes beyond this component. The gap between wages and
alternatives, the average surplus, accounts for most of the pro￿le beyond 100 workers.
Part of this rise in the surplus is due technological differences across industry. Industries
33with larger workplaces tend to have larger values of A which is re￿ected in the surplus.
As discussed earlier the value of A includes not just the contribution of other factors of
production but any differences in the bargaining strength of workforces relative to em›
ployers. While our model does not exclusively model collective bargaining, but it does
provide a surplus in equilibrium to be bargained over collectively.
Explaining the size pro￿le by component of worker characteristics, technology and
collective bargaining are not novel. But the estimated model provides one more compo›
nent: better matching of talent to technology in larger ￿rms. The second panel in Figure
8 shows the surplus (W⋆ − V) by ￿rm size for Manufacturing and FIRE. The ￿tted values
from a regression interacting industry with the intercept and size are also shown. (The
null hypothesis that the industry›speci￿c size pro￿les are zero is rejected, F8,747 = 11.93.)
The larger intercept for FIRE re￿ects a greater value of A, but the size pro￿les and their
differences are due to both technology and coworker interaction. The pro￿le is ￿atter
in FIRE than in Manufacturing. Recalling that FIRE has an estimate of β near 0 there is
much less scope for synergies between coworkers to increase surplus. The estimated β in
Manufacturing is larger and allows for synergy. The fact that the trend is upward sloping
means that the mixture of talents in larger workplaces tends to be better suited to the
technology than in smaller workplaces.
3.3.4 A Possible Extension: Workplace Dynamics
Our model could be extended to form the basis of a dynamic analysis of matched
panel data. We treat the current workers as given, but clearly a workforce at a point in
time is a lagged endogenous outcome. The model generates reasons why workers would
move from one workforce to another: as their skills and their coworker skills evolve
they may match up better with a different workforce. The increased productivity due to
that better match is spread among all new coworkers but if it outweighs the loss from
the current ￿rm the worker can be enticed to move. This worker loses seniority and
34hence bargaining power, but the estimated model allows for a bargaining parameter ( d)
speci￿c to outside workers negotiating to join a workplace. In the model estimated here
external workers capture almost 70% of the surplus from joining an outside ￿rm. In this
static analysis this parameter is not estimated on actual moves but rather is used to tune
hypothetical outside alternatives V (z). A dynamic model would have to complete the
transition between arriving and existing workers.
Workers of any talent may ￿nd better matches, but workers with different talents will
not always agree on their preferred destinations. As discussed earlier, high talent workers
may be attracted to low talent workforces and vice versa. In a dynamic context, mobility
slows down with seniority in the preferred model not to avoid loss of speci￿c talent but
loss in speci￿c bargaining power. The joint production technology suggests that some of
the observed wage›size pro￿le is due to a correlation between workforce ef￿ciency and
￿rm size. A dynamic model might amplify this effect since small ￿rms that happen to
attract a good mix of workers are more attractive to outsiders than ￿rms that have a bad
match between technology and talent. Size grows not for scale reasonsbut to exploit early
advantages which can persist.
4. Conclusions
This paper considers an alternative to equating a worker’s wage as their VMP de￿ned
independently of their coworkers. To gain traction on this goal some of the lessons from
research based on that assumption have been ignored. For example, we conduct a cross›
sectional analysis treating the current characteristics of all workers as given, including
their experience and seniority. Our model of coworker interaction is based on the task
assignment model of production. Unlike most previous applications of task assignment
models, our approach generates a ￿rm›speci￿c surplus that must be allocated among all
coworkers. Equilibrium wages must also account for variation in an individual’s value
marginal product across outside workplaces. A multilateral Nash bargaining solution
35provides a generalization to the standard linearly separable model. Our speci￿cation
makes it feasible to impose restrictions of the model on over 20,000 individual workplaces
at each point in the estimation procedure. We parameterize the technology so that the
linear technology is a special case, which is rejected with a conventional likelihood ratio
test in favor a joint technology. The linear case is also outperformed in an out›of›sample
validation.
Thus, accounting for joint production provides a viable alternative explanation of the
data. The model adds only eight free parameters to the linear model, so the difference in
￿t is highly signi￿cant but not strikingly different. However, joint production provides
a quite different explanation. Workplaces with more overall seniority are not more pro›
ductive, in the sense that they support greater total payrolls. But within workplaces more
seniorworkersgetalargershareofthesurplusthantheirexternaltalentjustify. Themodel
attributes this to more bargaining power due to relative seniority. Relative seniority is
not observed in data on individuals. Our estimates exploit the feature of matched data
sets that total payroll is observed. Our analysis explains mixed results from previous
research on seniority wage pro￿les through a weak (non›existent) productivity effect and
a relative seniority effect. We have also shown that taking coworkers seriously can affect
the interpretation of gender and ￿rm›size wage differentials.
5. Appendix
Proof of Implication I1
I1a. In the absence of a cut›off rule, the workplace can allocate a fraction of the
density of talent at level a to each task. Let ϕ(a) ∈ [0,1] denote the fraction















+ µ0(a)ϕ(a) + µ1(a)(1 − ϕ(a)).






A|β|ϕ(a)a1−|β|[q1(a)]|β|−1 β < 0
Aβϕ(a)a[q1(a)]|β|−1 β > 0.

















a1/(1−|β|) β > 0
The ￿rst order conditions for ϕ(a) can be written




[Ka − λa|β|]g(a;Xfγ) β < 0













For interior solutions such that 0 < ϕ(a) < 1 the right hand sides are zero since
µ0 = µ1 = 0. From A1 g(a;Xfγ) > 0, so the left hand side is zero only when
the difference is zero. In both cases the difference is between a straight line
through the origin and a positive power of a. Thus it is only zero for at most
one point  a > 0. In both cases the difference begins at 0 for a = 0, goes negative
and reaches 0 again at a =  a, then becoming positive. Thus, for a <  a it must be
that µ0 > 0 and µ1 = 0 and hence ϕ(a) = 0. For a >  a, µ0 = 0 and µ1 > 0, and hence
ϕ(a) = 1. This proves that the optimal assignment of talent is (6). Solving for
a =  a,
 a =
{
(λ/K)−1/(1+β) β < 0,
(λ/K)(1−β)/β β > 0.
37I1b. From the expression for  a we see that Xf only enters through λ. Monotonicity








Holding  a constant while increasing λ, the left hand side is constant. The
right hand side is increasing (since q⋆
1(a;λ) increases with λ for all a). Hence an
increase in λ must be offset by an increase in  a, proving monotonicity between
the two elements of the optimal workplace allocation.
I1c. When β = 0, then Q2(a,q1;0) = a. Total production, NQ(Xγ;C) = A(ι′E[a|X]), is
invariant to q1 so it is optimal to allocate no talent to task 1 and workplace
output is linearly separable across workers.
I1d. To solve the assignment problem one integral enters a single non›linear equa›
tionin λ. Therootfoundusingbi›sectionandNewtoniteration. Continuityand
monotonicity imply that the solution to λ is also continuous in the parameters
as are workplace revenue and other aspects of the workplace.
I1e. For β ̸= 0 continuity of the model’s predictions is straightforward. The technol›
ogyinA2issmoothin β andallotherparameters. Then  aiscontinuousbecause
it is the unique solution to a non›linear equation that varies continuously in
the parameters and has a non›zero Jacobian everywhere. Given  a the solution
for λ is similarly continuous. Continuity extends through all integrals because
the bounds and the integrands are continuous in the parameters, λ, and  a.
At β = 0, continuity is slightly complicated because the technology in A2 is
continuous (but not differentiable) in β. Approaching 0 from either direction
thetechnologyiscontinuousandbounded. Frombelowwesee limβ↑0 λ → 0and
limβ↑0  a = 0. The contribution of task 1 to integrals approaches
∫ 0
0 00f(0). The
density (3) is bounded at 0 under (A1). Thus the limit is 0. In other words,
task 1 output goes to 0 even though output at exactly a = 0 is unbounded.
For β > 0, it is dif￿cult to prove what the limit of λ is as β ↓ 0, or even if
38it has a limit. However, predictions only depend on λ and  a through total
output. Note that total supply of task 1 output is bounded by K = (ι′E[a|X])/A
total output at β = 0 divided by A. Therefore total output must be below
the value of giving each person assigned to task 2 K units of task 1 output.
Substituting this into total output results in an upper bound for output of
AKβ ∫ ∞
 a ag(a)da ≤ A1−β [
ιE[a|X]
]β+1. Optimal output must be below this upper
boundwhichconvergestoseparableoutput, A(ι′E[a|X],as β → 0. Thisisfeasible
becauseitcanbeachievedbyletting q1(a) → 0and  a → 0aswell. Thus, NQ(Xγ;C)
is continuous at β = 0 and therefore continuous for β ∈ (−1,1).
Proof of Implication I3. Let R equal total revenue including the employer’s share; let η
denote the employer’s bargaining power, and let π⋆
n denote the power of worker n. The
sum of the workforce parameters is 1−η =
∑N
n=1 π⋆
n. Let P denote the employers pro￿t and
Wn the worker’s salary. Then the canonical Nash bargaining problem among the N + 1




(Wn − V ⋆
n)π
⋆








the workforce as the whole receives
∑
Wn = (1 − η)(R −
∑
V ⋆
n). We can then consider the
sub›problem of allocating this across workers. The problem can be written
max
∏









Then de￿ne Vn = V ⋆
n/(1 − η), Q = R/(1 − η), and πn = π⋆
n/(1 − η). We then arrive at a problem
equivalent to (D3).
Proof of Implication I4: See Lensberg (1988)).
Proof of Implication I5.
39I5a. Under V (z) no worker in a feasible workplace will prefer to leave and take a
random match to another workplace.
I5b. For VU = 0 and h = 0 V (z) = 0 for all z. All workplaces are feasible and all
workers receive a positive share of the revenue, which also equals the surplus.
Thus V (z)isanequilibrium. V (z)iscontinuousin VU and h, soforsomerangeof
values above 0 all workplaces stay feasible and the corresponding V (z) remains
an equilibrium.
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42Table 1. Norwegian Workplaces, 1997 (20% sample, F=20,542)
Workplace Size Category (Nf)
Pct in 2-5 Total >100 51-100 21-50 6-20 2-5 Industry
74% 1,039 2 5 32 226 774 No code
68% 766 10 18 52 177 522 Elect.
Agric., Mining,
41% 1,811 76 91 263 699 750 Manufacturing
55% 1,805 13 25 110 631 997 Construction
57% 6,295 17 48 301 2256 3610 retail trade
Wholesale &
60% 1,559 26 32 108 444 935 Comm. 
Trans., Storage &
60% 2,085 28 46 144 601 1256 FIRE
47% 5,284 83 218 686 1760 2470 Services
55% 20,542 255 483 1,696 6,794 11,314 Total
100% 99% 96% 88% 55% Dist. (%)
Cumulative  
Table 2. Workers in Norway, 1997 (20% sample; N =247,521)
d Default category is no education level recorded (3% of the sample).
c Years since joining workplace, censored at 20 years.
b Full-time equivalent years since 1968, from public pension records.
a Monthly kroner / 1000 (approx. US$150).
St. Dev. Mean diag(M) Name Variable
12.403 19.074 - W
o Earnings
a
0.452 1 FEM Female
9.608 13.248 1 EX Experience
b
2.920 2.678 1 EX
2 Experience Squared/100
7.427 4.683 0 EXxFEM Experience X Female
5.976 5.432 0 SN Seniority
c
1.258 0.652 0 SN
2 Seniority
2 / 100
5.975 4.434 0 SNxFT Seniorty X Fulltime
1.215 0.554 0 SN
2xFT (Seniority
2 / 100)  X Fulltime
4.402 2.262 0 SNxFEM Seniorty X Female
3.155 0.978 0 SNxED Seniorty X (E5+E6)
0.760 1 FT Fulltime Worker
EDUC Education
d
0.130 1 E1  <= 9yrs
0.332 1 E2 10 or 11 yrs
0.313 1 E3 12 or 13 yrs
0.151 1 E4 14-16 yrs
0.044 1 E5  >= 17 yrs
43Table 3. Selected Worker Characteristics by Industry
Worker Characteristics
Education (yrs)
14-16 12-13 10-11 Fulltm. Sen. Exper. Female Industry
0.15 0.35 0.29 0.73 1.09 11.59 0.41 No code
0.07 0.38 0.33 0.83 7.73 15.94 0.21 Agr. Min. Elect.
0.06 0.33 0.37 0.90 6.42 14.57 0.27 Manufacturing
0.04 0.42 0.35 0.94 5.04 14.05 0.09 Construction
0.07 0.33 0.40 0.66 4.90 10.73 0.50 Trade
0.06 0.34 0.40 0.83 4.77 15.64 0.28 Comm. 
Trans., Storage &
0.19 0.38 0.25 0.86 4.95 13.86 0.43 FIRE
0.29 0.23 0.29 0.66 5.67 13.02 0.67 Services
Mean values of elements of x within industry.










overall Mean of Co-Worker Values
0.45 2.29 8.90 7.71 Earnings 
0.19 0.06 0.20 0.15 Education <= 9yrs
0.43 0.05 0.19 0.20 Education 14-16 yrs
0.40 1.48 6.18 5.32 Experience
0.54 0.69 3.78 3.74 Seniority
0.49 0.07 0.32 0.27 Fulltime Worker
0.54 0.07 0.36 0.32 Female
44Table 5. Linear Technology Parameter Estimates (Mincer›like Wage Regressions)
A
g
Std.Err Estimate Std.Err Estimate Variable Par
-   1.000 - 1.000 External Barg. Power d
-   0.000 - 0.000 Value of Unemployment VU
0.001 * 10.036 0.001 * 10.186 Measurement Error SD s
0.115 * 10.676 0.102 * 10.450 No code
0.120 * 12.236 - 10.450 Agric., Mining, Elect.
0.101 * 10.690 - 10.450 Manufact.
0.105 * 10.352 - 10.450 Construction
0.102 * 10.810 - 10.450 Wholesale & retail trade
0.109 * 11.259 - 10.450 Trans., Storage & Comm. 
0.115 * 12.401 - 10.450 FIRE
0.090 * 9.492 - 10.450 Services
0.0076 * -0.196 0.0080 * -0.232 Female
0.0005 * 0.052 0.0005 * 0.052 Experience
0.0014 * -0.116 0.0014 * -0.117 Experience Squared/100
0.0076 -0.0009 0.0005 -0.0006 Experience X Female
0.0023 * 0.035 0.0025 * 0.036 Seniority
0.0128 * -0.146 0.0138 * -0.150 Seniority
2 / 100
0.0024 * -0.025 0.0026 * -0.026 Seniorty X Fulltime
0.0129 * 0.121 0.0139 * 0.125 (Seniority
2 / 100)  X Fulltime
0.0007 * -0.003 0.0007 * -0.003 Seniorty X Female
0.0002 * -0.0075 0.0003 * -0.009 Seniorty X (E5+E6)
0.0080 * 0.436 0.0085 * 0.472 Fulltime Worker
0.0053 * -0.336 0.0054 * -0.333 Education                    <= 9yrs
0.0039 * -0.256 0.0039 * -0.252 10 or 11 yrs
0.0036 * -0.117 0.0036 * -0.111 12 or 13 yrs
0.0041 * 0.091 0.0042 * 0.069 14-16 yrs
0.0042 * 0.287 0.0043 * 0.277  >= 17 yrs
694,579 698,252 -ln likelihood
7345.7 2*increment (c27)
* significant at the 1% level. 




coefficients in g set to 0. * significant at the 1% level.
Estimates of industry-specific coefficients A not reported.  Seniority
Std.Err Estimate Variable Par
0.0054 * 0.695 External Barg. Power d
0.3666 * -1.519 Value of Unemployment VU
0.0010 * 9.951 Measurement Error SD s
0.0544 0.067 No code
0.0609 * 0.326 Agric., Mining, Elect.
0.0534 * 0.161 Manufact.
0.0551 0.068 Construction
0.0537 * 0.162 Wholesale & retail trade
0.0552 * 0.157 Trans., Storage & Comm. 
0.0458 0.00031 FIRE
0.0937 * -0.671 Services
0.0140 * -0.247 Female
0.0027 * 0.060 Experience
0.0062 * -0.134 Experience
2/100
0.0006 * 0.00147 Experience X Female
0.0219 * 0.479 Fulltime Worker
0.0198 * -0.415 Education                               <= 9yrs
0.0150 * -0.318 10 or 11 yrs
0.0078 * -0.147 12 or 13 yrs
0.0055 * 0.067 14-16 yrs
0.0131 * 0.273  >= 17 yrs
0.0077 * 0.087 Seniority
0.0422 * -0.280 Seniority
2 / 100
0.0066 -0.002 Seniorty X Fulltime
0.0402 0.032 (Seniority
2 / 100)  X Fulltime
0.0021 * -0.032 Seniorty X Female





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































47Table 8. Wage Variation and Assumed Technology
Standard Deviations
Linear Joint Data source
7.24 7.29 12.40 overall Payroll
5.25 5.92 8.90 between workplaces
5.44 5.08 9.98 within
6.89 5.81 overall V(z)
4.88 4.04 between workplaces
5.44 4.63 within
48